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San Diego Gas & Electric: A
Regulation Gone Too Far?
Since the time of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,' local governments have vigorously exercised their constitutionally recognized
police power to regulate land use through zoning." This form of
regulation burdens the landowner; his property is restricted in use
and sometimes reduced in value.8 If the owner challenges the zoning regulations, some will fail to survive scrutiny under the Constitution for two reasons: (1) inherent, though imprecisely defined,
limitations on the power to zone4 and (2) the conflict those regulations may have with the fifth amendment prohibition against the
taking of private property without compensation.'
While the courts have focused on developing and refining the
standards by which to review zoning regulations,6 only in recent
1. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The Court upheld zoning as a valid exercise of the
police power.
2. For a view on the proliferation of zoning and its consequences, see D.
HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DRVELOPMENT AND CONTROL

LAW (1971).

3. Courts have upheld land use regulations where the diminution in value
was quite extensive. In Hadachek v. Sebastian, 230 U.S. 394 (1915), the Supreme
Court upheld a nuisance law which prohibited the establishment and maintenance of a brickyard, although the value of the land was decreased by over ninety
percent, from $800,000 to $60,000. Another case in which a prohibition on the
most beneficial use of the property was upheld is Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). There the Court upheld an ordinance which prohibited
the use of the land for a sand and gravel pit operated by the landowner for over
30 years. Most recently in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) the Supreme Court upheld a zoning regulation which limited density on a five acre parcel to five homes.
4. The police power is not without its limits. "The oft repeated, although illdefined, limitation upon the exercise of the zoning power requires that zoning
ordinances be enacted for the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the community." National Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 547
(1965). See also Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
5. U.S. CONsT. amend. V provides in relevant part: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." The argument made, as
this note will explore, is that although a zoning ordinance provides for a public
benefit, that benefit is gained by "taking" from the landowner an ability to use
the zoned property in some manner. See text accompanying notes 18-21 infra.
6. The Supreme Court has decided relatively few land use cases since Euclid
as the issues tend to be factual rather than legal or turn on interpretation of state
law. However, examples of the analytical standards used by the Court in assessing
land use regulations may be found in the following cases: Nectow v. Cambridge,
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years have they been forced to deal with a logical inconsistency in
one of their analytical frameworks.7 For, despite numerous decisions holding zoning regulations unconstitutional because they
amount to a "taking ' ' s prohibited by the fifth amendment, no court
has ever awarded the relief required by that amendment-just
compensation. 9
277 U.S. 183 (1928) (rezoning which resulted in significant loss in value was invalid on fourteenth amendment due process grounds as the loss to property owner
outweighed benefit to community); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590 (1962) (a prohibition on the use of land for a sand and gravel pit was upheld
on the basis that there were other reasonable uses for the property and thus there
existed no fourteenth amendment violation for taking of property without due
process of law). See also note 17 infra. For a discussion of how the courts review
the validity of zoning ordinances, see W. STOEBUCK, NONTRESPASSORY TAKINGS IN
EMINENT

DOMAIN (1971).

7. Two state supreme courts have recognized this inconsistency and have
held that an invalid zoning ordinance is not a taking for fifth amendment just
compensation purposes. The New York Court of Appeals concluded that the exercise of regulatory police powers by government cannot effect a taking of property.
Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 594-96, 350
N.E.2d 381, 384-86, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 8-9, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 429
U.S. 990 (1976). The California Supreme Court held that a landowner may not
sue in inverse condemnation in challenging a government's exercise of its regulatory power and thus "transmute an excessive use of the police power into a lawful
taking for which compensation in eminent domain must be paid." Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 273, 598 P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 375 (1979), aff'd
on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). In both of these cases the Supreme Court
did not address this issue.
8. The term "taking" has avoided precise definition. Justice Brennan, writing
for the majority in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104
(1979) stated, "The question of what constitutes a 'taking' for purposes of the
Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty ...
[T]his Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public
action be compensated by the government." Id. at 123-24.
9. See, e.g., Corthouts v. Town of Newington, 140 Conn. 287, 99 A.2d 112
(1953); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 12 II. 2d 40, 145 N.E.2d 65 (1957);
William Murray Builders, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 254 So. 2d 364 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1971); Pure Oil Div. of Union Oil v. City of Brook Park, 26 Ohio App. 2d
153, 269 N.E.2d 853 (1971); Spaid v. Board of County Comm'rs, 259 Md. 369, 269
A.2d 797 (1970); Stevens v. Town of Huntington, 20 N.Y.2d 352, 229 N.E.2d 591,
283 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1967). While these courts did not state that just compensation
would never be paid, the relief afforded was declaratory or injunctive. A possible
reason for this result may be that due process and just compensation analyses
were confused. See Haley, Balancing Private Loss Against Public Gain to Test
for a Violation of Due Process or a Taking Without Just Compensation, 54
WASH. L. REV.315 (1979) and note 7 supra. If these courts viewed the issue as one
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The fifth amendment's just compensation clause, which is applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment, 0 fails to
define what type of government action will constitute a "taking"
and whether all "takings" require compensation." Traditionally, a
"taking" is found where government has exercised its power of eminent domain and, through condemnation proceedings, has compelled the landowner to relinquish his fee." Where government has
acquired or damaged the landowner's property without employing
condemnation proceedings, the landowner has an action for "inverse condemnation." 8 In either situation, the underlying principle is that the government "taking" constitutes a physical acquisiof due process, declaratory or injunctive relief would be proper.
10. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980);
Chicago B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239, 241 (1897). In Chicago B.
& Q., the Court stated: "The conclusion of the court on this question is that since
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, compensation for private property
taken for public uses constitutes an essential element. in 'due process of law,' and
that without such compensation the appropriation of private property to public
uses ...

would violate the provisions of the Federal Constitution." Id. at 239.

11. See note 8 supra.
12. "The power to take private property for public uses, generally termed the
right of eminent domain, belongs to every independent government." United
States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 518 (1883). The Court recognized a definition of eminent
domain "to be the right of disposing, in case of necessity and for the public safety,
of all the wealth of the country." Id. at 519. See also United States v. Willow
River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945); Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
For an exposition of the historical roots of the taking or eminent domain power
see F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING IssuE (1973) and W.
STOEBUCK, supra note 6.
13. Inverse condemnation is a proceeding whereby the private landowner
seeks compensation for property the government has already taken but without
instituting eminent domain proceedings. Inverse condemnation is used to prevent
government from evading its constitutional duty to pay just compensation, i.e., to
prevent a de facto taking of property without just compensation. It is similar to
the course of events in a regulatory taking situation because in both inverse condemnation and regulatory taking the government has done an affirmative act
which burdens private property. The distinction is that with a regulatory taking
there is, arguably, no "taking" which requires just compensation, while in inverse
condemnation, the property is "taken," but before payment. Regulatory takings
are often phrased as matters of inverse condemnation. "Inverse condemnation is
'acause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no
formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking
agency.'" United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980), quoting D. HAGMAN,
supra note 2 at 328.
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tion or invasion of all or part of the landowner's property."

The issue of "regulatory taking" is raised when government
has imposed only restrictions on the use of land pursuant to its
zoning power; there is no physical acquisition or invasion. 16 Yet,
the use and value in the property that the landowner relinquishes
have been "taken" for the public good."6 For the court to invalidate the zoning ordinance, the landowner must succeed in showing
that it is "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable."17 This is demon14. In Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 955 (1963), the court found that noise, vibration and smoke produced by
the operation and maintenance of military aircraft, which adjacent property owners claimed interfered with the use and enjoyment of their property, did not
amount to a taking by inverse condemnation. The property owners had not
sought to establish a taking on the basis that the aircraft invaded that airspace
within the dominion of the landowner. The court reviewed similar cases and
stated: "We are cited to no decisions holding that the United States is liable for
noise, vibration or smoke without a physical invasion .... Absent such physical
invasion recovery has been uniformly denied." Id. at 584 (emphasis added).
15. A "regulatory taking" as used in this note refers to a situation where a
plaintiff-landowner complains that the use of his property has been so restricted
by zoning regulations that he has little if any beneficial ownership of the property
while still holding legal title with its corresponding duties, e.g., payment of taxes.
See, e.g., Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350
N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976), where the
New York Court of Appeals recognized that while there may be a significant diminution in value of property through imposition of zoning regulations, there could
be no taking without physical acquisition, acquisition of title, or occupation by
the government. The court invalidated the regulation on due process grounds. Id.
at 595-96, 350 N.E.2d at 386-87, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 9-11.
16. Where a land use regulation arguably deprives a landowner of substantially all beneficial use of his property but which, in its general application, satisfies a "substantive" due process analysis, the issue is whether the benefit to the
public is so great that the burden in providing the benefit should rightfully be
borne by the public as a whole rather than by the individual landowner in particular. Whether the court will find a taking which requires compensation or merely
hold the regulation invalid as applied to the specific landowner is another question. See note 32 infra. For a discussion of the balancing of private loss against
public gain when restrictions are imposed on land, see Haley, supra note 9.
17. The "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable" standard is recited frequently by the courts. Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); Fred F.
French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385
N.Y.S.2d 5, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. City of
Evanston, 57 Ill. 2d 415, 312 N.E.2d 625 (1974), LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of
Cook, 12 Ill. 2d 40, 46, 145 N.E.2d 65, 68 (1957). The precise test or tests to
determine what is "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable" is not clear. To determine whether a government act is a regulation or taking, several tests have been
used: the "physical invasion" test where the government has invaded the land-
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strated by proving: (1) that the government has an illegitimate
purpose in enacting the ordinance; 8 (2) that the ordinance itself
fails to rationally relate to the stated legitimate purpose;19 or (3)
that despite being a rational means to promote a legitimate purpose, the ordinance either fails to promote that purpose when applied to a specific landowner2 0 or deprives a specific landowner of
all or substantially all beneficial use of his property. 1 When the
landowner has successfully proved his case in reliance on one of
these analyses, the courts often explicitly or implicitly hold that a
"taking" of property has occurred, although no compensation is ordered. 2 The confusion is created then because it is unclear
whether the courts have invalidated the zoning regulations on due
process grounds and incorrectly used the term "taking" to describe
that outcome, or whether the regulations were indeed a fifth
amendment taking but declaratory relief alone was deemed
owner's property; the "diminution in value" test where the focus is on the degree
of harm imposed upon the landowner; the "balancing" test where the social benefit is balanced against the private loss; and the "harm/benefit" test where an inquiry is made as to whether the regulation simply restrains conduct harmful to
others or whether its purpose is the bestowing of benefits on the public by exaction of a public good from private property. See Michelman, Property, Utility
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation"
Law, 80 HAV. L. R.v. 1165, 1190-96 (1967).
18. Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
19. Id.
20. Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 185 (1928); Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 58 (1938).
21. Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350
N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976). This standard
would appear to be the one most related to a traditional taking because of the
economic damages involved. However, where a zoning regulation fails on due process grounds, i.e., where it is not enacted to promote the public health, safety and
welfare, there would be no public use. With no public use, the eminent domain
power could not be validly exercised.
22. See note 9 supra. The proof for the standards set forth in the text accompanying notes 18-21 supra may be made using a number of factors. See LaSalle
Nat'l Bank v. City of Evanston, 57 II. 2d 415, 312 N.E.2d 625 (1974).
23. See, e.g., Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124, 336 A.2d 239 (1975), where "taking" was used in a discussion of compensation, and Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 374 A.2d 954 (1977), where the term was used in discussing
the due process issue. In LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 12 Ill. 2d 40, 4647, 145 N.E.2d 65, 69 (1957), the court noted several factors deemed relevant to
the due process issue. In a later case between the same parties (although in a
different court) the same factors were used in considering the compensation issue.
LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 60 IM.App. 2d 39, 51, 208 N.E.2d 430, 436
(1965).

148.
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sufficient.2
The Supreme Court has never explicitly stated that a fifth
amendment taking encompasses both eminent domain takings and
regulatory takings.2 5 The initial view of the matter was that of Justice Harlan in Mugler v. Kansas.2 He saw police power regulation
to be different in kind, rather than degree, from the eminent domain power.2 7 In 1922, the Court appeared to reverse its view in
the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon.2" There, Justice Holmes stated the general rule to be that "while property may
be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
"029
recognized as a taking. . . [T]his is a question of degree ....
it did not award comYet, while the Court there found a 5taking,
pensation to the successful plaintiff. 0
24. Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587,
591-92 (1938). The court held a zoning classification to be "unreasonable" and a
"taking." The court, however, merely invalidated the ordinance as applied to the
landowner.
25. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978),
where the Court, after stating the difficulty it has had in developing a "set
formula" for determining what constitutes a taking, stated in a footnote that it
does not endorse the view that a taking can never occur absent a physical acquisition or invasion. Id. at 123-24 n. 25. See note 17 supra for the various tests that
have been used.
26. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). In that case the Court upheld a Kansas statute that
prohibited the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. Plaintiff owned a
brewery which was made practically worthless by the statute. Since the purpose
of the statute was to promote the general health, morals and safety of the community, and because the owner still could use his land for any lawful purpose, Justice
Harlan concluded there was no taking in this case.
27. Id. at 667-69. Justice Harlan stated: "The exercise of the police power by
the destruction of property which is itself a public nuisance, or the prohibition of
its use in a particular way, whereby its value becomes depreciated, is very different from taking property for public use, or from depriving a person of his property without due process of law. In one case, a nuisance only is abated; in the
other, unoffending property is taken away from an innocent owner." Id. at 669
(emphasis added).
28. 260 U.S. 392 (1922). Pennsylvania had passed the Kohler Act which prohibited the mining of coal in such a way as to cause the subsidence of, inter alia,
any building or structure. The plaintiffs purchased the property from the coal
company prior to passage of the Kohler Act. However, the deed expressly reserved the right to remove the coal lying underneath the house and recited that
the grantee waived all claims for damages resulting from the mining of the coal.
29. Id. at 415-16.
30. Id. at 413-16. The Court held the statute invalid on the basis that the Act
exceeded the police power, in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
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Since Pennsylvania Coal, the Court has focused on the difficult issue of defining the boundary where regulation ends and taking begins.81 This would seem to be an affirmation of the Pennsylvania Coal rule's underlying premise that an invalid regulation can
result in a fifth amendment taking.8 2 There is historical evidence ss
and legal theory, 4 however, that supports the argument that violations of the police power and eminent domain power are to be analyzed differently under the Constitution and are to be accorded
different remedies.
31. See note 6 supra.
32. A zoning regulation may, of course, be invalid on due process grounds for
failure to survive an ends/means analysis. See text accompanying notes 18 & 19
supra. In a traditional taking analysis the purpose for which property is taken
must also be a valid one. See text accompanying notes 12 & 13 supra. In terms of
"regulatory taking," the issue is not whether the regulation fails
the ends/means
analysis in general, but only if it fails as applied to a specific landowner. See
notes 20 & 21 supra.
33. At English law, the Crown was permitted to use private property without
compensation, but it could not acquire estates in land unless the landowner was
compensated. This was the situation as it existed when the Constitution was
drafted. It was reasonable then that the drafters of the Constitution recognized
the inherent authority of government to both regulate and acquire land for public
purposes. Moreover, it seems apparent that the "taking of property" which concerned the drafters was a physical taking rather than a limitation on land use.
The popular notion at the time was "no taking without a touching." The term
"property" appeared to mean physical property which could be transferred from a
private landowner to the government. Given these interpretations, it is arguable
that the drafters' intent was to afford a dollar remedy only for takings amounting
to a physical acquisition of property, a distinction being drawn between acquisitions and restrictions on use. For a thorough discussion of this historical aspect of
"taking" see W. STOEBUCK, supra note 6, at 4-15; F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 12, at
51-104.
34. To satisfy due process a zoning regulation must further the public health,
safety and welfare, i.e., it must have a legitimate and rational means to accomplish the legitimate purpose. See text accompanying notes 18-21 supra. A regulation failing this due process test is not a public use and therefore may not be
compensated under the just compensation clause. Therefore, when a zoning regulation is found invalid because it deprives the owner of substantially all beneficial
use of his property, it may be viewed in two ways: (1) a deprivation of the owner's
property without due process of law or (2) a violation of the just compensation
clause because the property was taken without payment of just compensation.
The issue is then whether a landowner can force the payment of just compensation for a "regulatory" taking (see Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598
P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979)), or whether taking merely defines the scope of
the police power, the result being that the regulation is invalid (see Fred F.
French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385
N.Y.S.2d 5, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976)).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

If a regulatory taking by zoning ordinance is encompassed
within the fifth amendment, it does not necessarily follow that just
compensation should be the required remedy.85 There are significant policy reasons to limit the remedy for a regulatory taking to
declaratory relief. 6 To require local government to pay money for
37
regulatory takings would create a heavy financial burden. Innovative solutions to land use problems might be chilled because of a
tendency of local government to be overly cautious in exercising its
8
constitutionally recognized power to regulate land use. Courts, by
requiring compensation, would usurp the legislative prerogative to
seek or avoid condemnation. 89 The landowner might avoid challenging the zoning ordinance for fear his success would result in a
judicial condemnation of his property, a result he may not wish to
achieve. 0
Despite these historical, conceptual and policy reasons for distinguishing between the analyses and remedies for takings by eminent domain and those by regulation, the command of the fifth
amendment comes back to haunt; once a taking is judicially declared, compensation must be paid.
41
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego provided
the Supreme Court with the opportunity to resolve the dual issues
of whether a regulatory taking can ever be a taking for fifth
amendment just compensation purposes and, if so, whether any or
all regulatory takings require the payment of compensation as a
remedy. While the Court dismissed the case for lack of a final
judgment, it appears that five Justices would hold that a regulatory taking is a fifth amendment taking and can require just compensation in the form of money damages. Therefore, this case is
important because the conclusion and the reasoning of the dissent
are indicative of how a majority of the Court will probably decide
these issues when the proper case is before it. This note will explore the reasoning and ramifications, both conceptual and practical, of the potential ultimate holding by the Supreme Court that a
landowner could collect money damages upon a judicial determina35. Comment, Inverse Condemnation: Its Availability in Challenging the
Validity of a Zoning Ordinance, 26 STAN. L. R.v. 1439, 1443-46 (1974).
36. See notes 110-14 and accompanying text infra.
37. See note 112 and accompanying text infra.

38. See notes 115-19 and accompanying text infra.
39. See note 112 infra.
40. See note 127 and accompanying text infra.
41. 101 S. Ct. 1287 (1981).
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tion that a zoning regulation is invalid.
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION

In 1966, San Diego Gas & Electric Company acquired land lo-

cated in an area zoned by the City of San Diego for industrial
use. " ' In 1979, part of that land was down-zoned and designated as
open space.43 The city, pursuant to its open space plan, was to
purchase the property for park land but failed to do so."' The com-

pany was left holding the land zoned as open space and was prevented from constructing a nuclear power plant on the site. ' G
Because it could not use the site for the plant or any other

development, San Diego Gas filed suit in inverse condemnation
seeking damages of $6,150,000, mandamus and declaratory relief."
The suit alleged that the city had taken the company's property

without just compensation in violation of the fifth and fourteenth

amendments because the down-zoning and inclusion of the prop-

erty in the open space plan had deprived the company of all beneficial use of its property. "7 The trial court found for the company
42. San Diego Gas owned a total of 412 acres of land which it had acquired as

a possible site for a nuclear plant. The property was purchased for $1,700,000 in
1966. At that time, part of the property was in an industrial zoning classification
and part was in an agricultural "holding category" classification. Two hundred
fourteen acres of the property (which was unimproved) lay in or near a tidal estuary which is subject to flooding. The city's 1967 master plan designated the entire
area as an industrial zone. Id. at 1289-90.
43. In 1973, the City rezoned 39 acres of the property from an industrial to
an agricultural classification and increased the minimum lot size from one to ten
acres. It was also recommended that 50 acres of the site be considered for industrial development upon submission of specific plans therefor. The open space plan
was promulgated pursuant to California statute. CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 65563 (West
Supp. 1979). The city contended, however, that such a plan was not mandatory as
San Diego was a charter city, making compliance with the statute discretionary.
The open space plan also provided that the company's plans to construct the nuclear plant were not necessarily incompatible with the open space plan. 101 S. Ct.
at 1289-90.
44. A referendum to approve the issuance of bonds to purchase the land was
rejected by the voters. Id. at 1290.
45. It was alleged that the city had a policy of disapproving any development
inconsistent with the open space plan and that any proposal by San Diego Gas to
develop the property would have been futile. The trial court so found. Id. at 129091.
46. Id. at 1290.
47. Id. at 1290-91.
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8
and awarded money damages as payment of just compensation.
The appellate court affirmed, 9 and the California Supreme Court
granted review. 0
Before the hearing, however, the supreme court remanded the
case to the appellate court for reconsideration in light of the recently decided Agins v. City of Tiburon.51 Relying on that case, the
appellate court reversed the trial court, holding that compensation
52
was an improper remedy for an invalid Zoning ordinance. The
court, however, did not invalidate the San Diego zoning ordinance
or open space plan, indicating to the trial court that further factfinding was necessary.53 The California Supreme Court denied further review,5 4 and San Diego Gas appealed to the United States
Supreme Court." The company contended that the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution require the payment of
just compensation to it because a taking of private property can be
effectuated through regulation of land as well as by eminent
domain."

48. The trial court found that San Diego Gas had been deprived of all practical, beneficial or economic use of the property, that it would have been futile for
the plaintiff to propose a development plan to the city, and that the property had
at most a nominal fair market value under the open space designation. A subsequent jury trial on the issue of damages resulted in a judgment of $3 million. Id.
49. 146 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1978).
50. 101 S. Ct. at 1291.
51. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd on other
grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). In Agins, appellants' land was placed in a zoning
classification that limited density to between one and five single family homes on
a five acre tract. Without presenting a development proposal to the city, appellants brought an action against the city contending that the zoning classification
constituted a taking without just compensation in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The appellants sought only declaratory relief. On appeal
from the Supreme Court of California, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the issue
before it was whether the mere enactment of the zoning ordinance by the City of
Tiburon constituted a taking. Because the Court found that the ordinance substantially advanced a legitimate government interest in discouraging premature
and unnecessary urbanization of open space, did not place an unreasonable burden on the appellants, and did not prevent the best use of appellant's land, there
had been no taking. The Court did not reach the issue of whether the remedies
for inverse condemnation are limited to mandamus and declaratory judgment.
The California Supreme Court had previously so held. 447 U.S. at 260-63.
52. 101 S. Ct. at 1292 (citing the unpublished opinion of the appellate court).
53. Id. at 1292.
54. Id. at 1293.
55. Id.
56. Because the eminent domain power contemplates a taking of private
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The United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision,5 7 held
that the appeal must be dismissed. Justice Blackmun, writing for
the Court, found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the case because the appellate court's decision was not a final judgment5 He
reasoned that the lower court had not decided whether there had
been a taking at all. s
In his dissent,60 Justice Brennan argued that a final decision
had been rendered because the appellate court had ruled on the

taking issue.6" He then addressed the merits of the case.

The dual issues identified by Justice Brennan were: (1)

property for a public use, San Diego Gas apparently contended that the imposition of certain regulations could transform a private use of land into a public one.
See also note 5 supra.
57. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion in which the Chief Justice and
Justices Stevens and White joined. Justice Rehnquist filed a concurring opinion.
Justices Marshall, Powell and Stewart joined the dissenting opinion of Justice
Brennan.
58. 101 S. Ct. at 1293.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1977) grants jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to "review only final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a state in
which a decision could be had." 101 S. Ct. at 1293 n.10, 1294. The Court determined that the decision of the California Appellate Court contemplated further
proceedings by the trial court. The Court cited Gray's Harbor Co. v. Coats
Fordney Co., 243 U.S. 251 (1917) as precedent for the proposition that a state
court's determination that a taking had occurred without a determination of the
compensation due the property owner was "a classic example" of a state court
decision lacking finality. The Court noted that the instant case was the reverse of
this situation. The state court had determined that compensation was not available but had not decided finally whether a taking had occurred. Justice Rehnquist
filed a concurring opinion stating that while he agreed with much of the reasoning
of the dissent, he was not convinced that the appeal was from a final judgment
and therefore felt compelled to join the Court's opinion. He provided no other
indication of the exact extent of his agreement with the reasoning in the dissent.
101 S. Ct. at 1294 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
60. Justices Marshall, Powell and Stewart joined in the dissenting opinion.
61. Arguing that there had been a final decision, Justice Brennan pointed out
that the California Appellate Court had held that no matter how excessive or
arbitrary, a city's exercise of its police power could not amount to a taking under
the fifth and fourteenth amendments as a matter of federal constitutional law.
Therefore, the courts are banned from awarding just compensation as a remedy.
Justice Brennan reasoned that if the California Appellate Court had determined,
in accord with Agins, that no taking could result from the excessive or arbitrary
exercise of the city's police power, it had necessarily determined that there had
been no taking. The Court therefore erred, he stated, when it held that there was
no final judgment because "the Court of Appeal 'ha[d] not decided whether a
'taking'. . . ha[d] in fact occurred.'" 101 S. Ct. at 1297 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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whether a government entity's exercise of its regulatory police
power can ever effect a taking of private property for public use
within the meaning of the just compensation clause, and (2) if a
"regulatory taking" is possible, whether a government entity must
pay just compensation when such a taking is found. 2
Justice Brennan began his discussion by addressing the issue
of whether the excessive or arbitrary exercise of the police power
can ever effect a fifth amendment taking. He concluded that such a
taking could occur, basing his argument on both precedent and legal theory. s
Justice Brennan began his analysis by pointing to precedent.
The Court had recently held that a taking is effectuated if a zoning
.ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests
or if it denies the landowner economically viable use of his land.'
Looking back to Penn Central TransportationCo. v. City of New
York,"6 he noted that the Court there identified the factors of the
''economic impact of the regulation on the claimant" and the
"character of the government action" as critical in determining if a
taking had occurred." Finally, he noted that the Court, in Goldblatt v. Hempstead,6 7 made it clear that a regulation could be so
burdensome as to amount to a taking for which just compensation
would be required. 8
The underlying principle of these decisions for Justice Brennan was Justice Holmes' well-known phrase from Pennsylvania
Coal v. Mahon:" "The general rule at least is, that while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking. The determination of a taking is a
question of degree-and therefore cannot be disposed of by general
62. Id. at 1301 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 1301-04 '(Brennan, J., dissenting).
64. This reference to Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), can be

characterized as dicta because the Court found no taking there. The issue of
whether a police power regulation can effect a taking for which just compensation
must be paid was part of the controversy in Agins, but the Court did not reach
the issue. See also note 51 supra.
65. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
66. 101 S. Ct. at 1302 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

67. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
68. The regulation under attack in Goldblatt prohibited excavations below
the water table which effectively required that the property owner cease the operation of his sand and gravel mining business. Although this mining was the most
beneficial use of the property, the court found no taking.
69. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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propositions.""0 Justice Brennan saw from these cases that the determination of whether a taking has occurred requires a balancing
of the burden on the landowner and the benefit to the public. Like
Justice Holmes, Justice Brennan realized that some regulation is
necessary for government to function, but at the point a regulation
becomes so burdensome as to deny the owner the economically viable use of the land, a taking has occurred. He therefore accepted
Justice Holmes' language on its face; the regulation of land is a
matter of degree which, when it goes too far, will be recognized as
71
a taking.
As a second basis for his conclusion that a regulation can
amount to a taking, Justice Brennan argued on a conceptual level.
In his view there is an "essential similarity between 'regulatory
takings' and other 'takings' ,,72 which precludes limiting takings to
only those situations where government converts private property
for public use. Government action, short of actual conversion, can
indeed totally destroy the owner's property.738 Viewed from the perspective of the landowner, the Justice reasoned that there is little
difference whether his land is condemned or regulated when the
result is to deprive him of all beneficial use.7 As to the government, the benefits obtained through condemnation or regulation
may be the same.7
70. 101 S. Ct. at 1303 (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting Pennsylvania Coal,
260 U.S. at 416. The Court in Pennsylvania Coal found that a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting the mining of coal in such a way as to cause subsidence of the land
was a taking. The Court, however, did not order the payment of just compensation; it merely held the statute unconstitutional.
71. 101 S. Ct. at 1302 n.14 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
72. Justice Brennan also pointed out that a taking typically occurs when government condemns private property under eminent domain but a taking can also
occur through inverse condemnation, where government physically acquires or invades private property without instituting formal judicial proceedings. Id. at 1296
n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
73. Justice Brennan cited as support the case of Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,
80 U.S. (13 Wall) 166 (1872). In Pumpelly, a private company, pursuant to state
statute, constructed a dam which caused the flooding of private property. The
Court held that a taking had occurred. Later in the opinion, however, the Court
limited Pumpelly to cases where land is physically invaded by "superinduced additions of water, earth, sand or other material

. . .

so as to effectually destroy or

impair its usefulness ...." Id. at 181.
The other cases cited by Justice Brennan all involved a physical invasion of
some kind. One exception is Pennsylvania Coal. But see note 70 supra.
74. 101 S. Ct. at 1304 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
75. Id.
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Justice Brennan quickly rejected the city's argument that
there is a distinction between regulation and condemnation in that
with condemnation, government intends to take property. He
quoted from Hughes v. Washington:7 ' "[T]he Constitution measures a taking of property not by what a State says, or by what it
intends, but by what it does."'7 He therefore concluded that a reg-

ulation can be a taking and thus a de facto exercise of eminent
domain, if such regulation has the effect of depriving the owner of
all or most of his interest in the property.78
Having decided that a regulation can effect a taking for the
purposes of the just compensation clause, Justice Brennan next
turned to the core issue: whether a state may limit the property
owner's remedy to invalidation of the regulation and thus deny
compensation.7 ' In his view, the Constitution demands that compensation be paid whenever a taking is accomplished through a
regulation which has the effect of depriving the landowner of all or
substantially all beneficial use of the property.80
In the first part of his analysis, Justice Brennan noted the
mandatory character of the just compensation clause. 1 He stated
that once a court has determined that there has been a taking, the
property owner has already been deprived of his property. As such,
the Constitution has been violated, and the just compensation
clause requires that compensation be paid.8 2 Mere invalidation of
the regulation would not and could not adequately compensate the
76. 389 U.S. 290 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 298 (quoting Hughes at 298).
78. Justice Brennan distinguished regulation from "acquisition of title, occupancy or physical invasion." 101 S.Ct. at 1304 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79. Id.
80. Justice Brennan identified the following means by which a taking may be
accomplished: "formal condemnation, occupancy, physical invasion or regulation."
Id. at 1305 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Not all regulations would effect a taking,
however. Where a regulation does not promote the general health, safety or welfare, there would be no valid public use. The fifth amendment prohibition is on
the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Therefore, no payment of just compensation can be ordered when there is no public use.
Justice Brennan noted, however, that where there is no public use, a cause of
action for damages may be available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a due process
violation under the fourteenth amendment. 101 S.Ct. at 1306 n.23 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
81. 101 S.Ct. at 1305 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. Id., quoting from United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257, which described the just compensation clause as having a "self-executing character ...
with respect to compensation."
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landowner for damage occurring during the time his land was burdened by the regulation."s Not only would mere invalidation inadequately compensate the landowner and frustrate the specific remedy of the just compensation clause, it would also fail to carry out
the amendment's purpose. That purpose, according to Justice
Brennan, is to guarantee that no one property owner could be
forced to carry the burden that should rightfully be borne by the
public. The just compensation clause "operates to redistribute the
economic cost from the individual to the public at large." 8' In support of this proposition, he stated that because the purpose of a
police power regulation must be the furtherance of the public
health, safety, welfare and morals, it therefore follows that the
public is receiving a benefit while the owner's land is burdened
with the regulation." Payment of compensation would make the
landowner whole, thus putting him in the same position as he
would have been had the regulation not taken his property.8 7
In the second part of his analysis, Justice Brennan addressed
the effect the temporary nature of a regulation would have on the
constitutional mandate which requires the payment of just compensation for any type of taking. Examining the language of the
just compensation clause, he found nothing to suggest a temporary
taking should be considered differently than a permanent one. In
further support of his argument, Justice Brennan cited precedent
for his proposition that no distinction had been nor should be
made between temporary, reversible takings and permanent, irreversible ones.88
The temporary nature of a taking does affect the measure of
just compensation according to Justice Brennan.8 9 San Diego Gas
sought payment of the full fair market value of its property burdened by the regulation. Returning to the just compensation clause
83. 101 S. Ct. at 1305 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 1306 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85. Id.
86. Id. The test as to whether a police power regulation is substantially related to the promotion of the general health, safety, welfare and morals is typically used in a due process analysis. See W. STOEBUCK, supra note 6, at 201-02.
87. 101 S. Ct. at 1306 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. Id. Cited was United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). In Causby,
the federal government had leased an airport for use by military aircraft. The
frequent low altitude flights over adjacent land, making it impossible for the landowner to carry on his business, were held to be a taking even though the flights
could be suspended at any time.
89. 101 S.Ct. at 1307 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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itself, Justice Brennan noted that there is no indication that a
court is granted the power to order the condemnation of the property.' 0 Therefore, the amount of compensation is to be measured
according to the length of time the property is subject to the objectionable regulation." Justice Brennan would establish a constitutional rule requiring the length of'time for measurement of compensation for a temporary taking to commence with the point at
which a court determines that the regulation constituted a taking
and to end when the regulation is rescinded or amended so as to
no longer constitute a taking." Justice Brennan stated the essence
of the rule he proposed: "The only constitutional requirement is
that the landowner must be able meaningfully to challenge a regulation that allegedly effects a 'taking', and recover just compensation if it does so. He may not be forced to resort to piecemeal litigation or otherwise unfair procedures in order to receive his due.""
Finally, Justice Brennan rejected the public policy reasons for
limiting the remedies available to mandamus and declaratory relief
in regulatory taking cases. He criticized the California Supreme
Court for its holding in Agins v. City of Tiburon" that requiring
payment of just compensation where a regulation is held unconstitutional is not the proper nor desired remedy." That court rea90. Id.
91. Id. Justice Brennan noted that government may terminate condemnation
proceedings and it may cease the physical occupation of private property so as to
limit its monetary liability. He viewed rescission of the objectionable ordinance as
similar if not identical.
92. Id. at 1307-08 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The courts would be guided by
the principles applied in taking and condemnation cases. Justice Brennan suggested that a starting point be the valuation of the property at the time a court
determines that a taking has occurred. To aid the court in the proper assessment
of damages, he would require the government entity to advise the court as to
whether it intends to rescind or amend the regulation, or to institute formal condemnation proceedings. Whether the regulation would continue in effect or
whether condemnation proceedings would be commenced would not alter the result: in either case, payment of just compensation would be required.
93. Id. at 1308 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan further proposed
that so long as this constitutional requirement is met, the states are otherwise free
to experiment in applying this rule. As his rule mandates the payment of just
compensation whenever the existence of a taking has been judicially determined,
defines the time period as to when a temporary taking exists and points out that
the methods of assessing the proper amount of just compensation, the degree to
which the states can "experiment" appears very limited.
94. See note 51 supra.
95. 101 S. Ct. at 1308 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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soned that such a remedy would inhibit the freedom of municipalities in land use planning and regulation. Whatever the value of
these policy considerations, Justice Brennan was of the view that
the "applicability of express provisions of the Constitution" cannot
be determined by such policy considerations."
Despite the majority holding that the Supreme Court lacked
jurisdiction to review the California appellate court decision in San
Diego Gas due to a lack of a final judgment, 7 five members of the
Court apparently accept the view that an invalid land use regulation can effect a taking, 98 that a regulatory taking is essentially the
same as other types of takings," and that the fifth and fourteenth
amendments require that just compensation be paid once there has
been a judicial determination that a regulatory taking has occurred. 100 Mere invalidation of the regulation apparently can never
be adequate relief for three reasons: (1) it would not sufficiently
compensate the landowner; (2) it would frustrate the specific remedy of the just compensation clause; and (3) it would fail to carry
out the purpose of the just compensation clause. 10 1 Therefore, an
appropriate remedy for the imposition of a land use regulation
found to deprive a landowner of all or substantially all beneficial
use of his property is just compensation because such a regulation
would be a fifth amendment taking. 102 The fact that a taking by
regulation is temporary affects only the measure of the compensation to be paid, not the type of remedy.103 The five Justices would,
however, allow the government to limit, to a degree, the period
during which a taking is extant.1 4
THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY TAKING CASES

Although a majority of the Court declined to decide this case
on the merits, the concurring and dissenting opinions indicate that
five justices would reject the view of the California Supreme Court
that a landowner's only remedy in challenging an excessive use of
96. Id. at 1308-09 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

97. See text accompanying notes 52-58 supra.
98. See note 59 supra. Justice Rehnquist, while concurring with the plurality,

apparently agreed with the reasoning of the four member dissent.
99. See text accompanying notes 72-75 supra.
100. See note 82 and accompanying text supra.
101. See text accompanying notes 83-85 supra.
102. Id. See also note 81 supra.
103. See text accompanying notes 87-90 supra.
104. See text accompanying notes 64-69 supra.
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the zoning power is mandamus and/or declaratory relief."0 5 They
would hold that just compensation in the form of money damages
is a proper remedy.10 6 In cases where it can be shown that a land
use regulation deprives a landowner of all or substantially all beneficial use in his property, a taking would be found and payment of
money damages would be required. If a future majority follows
Justice Brennan's reasoning, the Court will have given literal
meaning to Justice Holmes' famous remark in Pennsylvania
Coal.1' 7 Thus, it would appear that the police power and the eminent domain power will be recognized as different only in degree,
not in kind.'0 s While giving life to Justice Holmes' "different in
degree" proposition, this majority would limit a government's liability for monetary damages by allowing the government to reverse
the taking by amending or rescinding the objectionable regulation.
Payment for the time period during which private property was
burdened with the regulation would amount to the rental on the
land. The government, by failing to amend or rescind the regulation, would imply its intention to purchase (i.e. condemn) the
property, for which it would then be required to pay the full, fair
market value.1 0 '
The practical effect of the dissent's reasoning in San Diego
Gas will be greatest on the legislative decision-making process.
Two major factors are part of that process: the unwanted acquisition of property and financial limitations of local government. 1 0
Under the dissent's reasoning, local governments would be
faced with either paying just compensation for a temporary taking
as valued over the period the objectionable regulation was in effect,
or paying the full, fair market value for the condemnation of the
property."' Assuming land use regulations are established to promote the general health, safety and welfare of the community on
105. See note 7 supra.
106. Presumably, invalidation of a regulation would still be the only proper
remedy in a taking case where, after it had been established that a taking had
occurred, it was shown that the taking was not for a public purpose. 101 S. Ct. at
1306 n.23 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See note 80 supra.
107. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
108. See notes 25-29 and accompanying text supra.
109. 101 S. Ct. at 1308 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110. While the general police power is a power of the states reserved under
the tenth amendment, most land use regulation decisions are delegated to local
government under state enabling legislation. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11
(1979).
111. See notes 91-93 supra.
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more than a temporary basis, the payment of temporary damages
would not achieve the desired result; the general health, safety and
welfare would be served only so long as the government would pay

temporary damages. It would therefore appear that government

would be well advised to condemn the property so as to give the
regulation a lasting effect. Assuming the financial ability to regu-

late land use routinely through the power of eminent domain, the

question becomes whether local government would have the political ability to do so. 1 12 The routine use of the eminent domain
power is antithetical to the basic theory of American government;
its use against private landowners should be a limited one.1"'
Therefore, even if a local government has the financial ability to do
so, by mandating the use of eminent domainj the dissent in San
Diego Gas will effectively limit its ability to regulate land because
of the direct political consequences.
The two major factors of unwanted acquisition of property
and the financial limitations of local government will undoubtedly
have the effect of "encourag[ing] municipalities to err on the constitutional side of police power regulation ..... I" Local legislators would no doubt wish to avoid the political consequences of
using eminent domain as a land use regulation tool and the more
indirect political consequences of having to raise taxes or cut services to pay regulatory taking judgments. 11 5 The possibility of hay-

112. In the event a judgment is awarded on the basis that a regulation effected a taking, the process by which such a judgment would be paid is hardly a
simple one and it may have long-term effects. For example, an Illinois statute
permits the borrowing of money to pay judgments and allows that taxes be levied
to repay the loan. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 9-105 (1979). For financial as well as
political reasons, the repayment term would no doubt be extended for a number
of years to minimize its impact on the taxpayers. Even if there were no statutory
limit on the total amount of indebtedness of a local government, such a burden
would undoubtedly affect the financial standing of a municipality, limiting its
ability to finance long-term debt for needed public projects. If the passage of a
constitutionally objectionable statute were construed as resulting from the malfeasance or misfeasance of the legislators, the public official liability insurance
carried by many municipalities would be affected. Depending upon how widespread judgments of regulatory takings become, the market price for such insurance coverage may increase dramatically. This occurrence would be no small matter, as the liability of local governments has recently been expanded. See Owen v.
City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Note, Owen v. City of Independence:
Municipal Liability, An Evolving Trend, 1 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 141 (1980).
113. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 224-318 (1978).

114. 101 S. Ct. at 1308 n.26 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
115. See notes 112 & 113 and accompanying text supra.
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ing to pay temporary taking damages would have a chilling effect

on the development of innovative solutions to land use problems as

well. 116 In situations like those in Agins117 and San Diego Gas,"'
where a municipality is mandated by state statute to develop a certain type of land use plan, local governments would be placed in a
very difficult situation. They would have the choice of violating
state law or complying with it and therefore being subject to judgment for monetary damages. 1 9
There is a possible reconciliation of the views of Justice Brennan and that of the California Supreme Court through analogy to

other areas of the law. The good faith exception to liability for

deprivations of personal liberty by law enforcement agencies is one
example. When law enforcement officials in good faith violate individual constitutional rights, the courts have found exemption from
the usual relief of money damages for the reason that to always
hold the police officer or agency liable would chill valid efforts to
enforce the law.12 0 Like Justice Brennan's temporary taking, in116. See Penn Central Transp. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.. 104 (1978);
Constr. Ind. Assoc. of Sonoma County v. City of Petuluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of
New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, appeal dismissed, 429
U.S. 990 (1976); Golden v. Planning Bd. of the Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359,
285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). This
chilling effect might very well have prevented the municipalities in Ramapo and
Petaluma from even considering growth control regulations, permitting unchecked urbanization of land and the consequent burden on city services. The
City of New York may have decided against any attempt to preserve a historic
landmark (Penn Central) or to maintain open space (Fred F. French). See also
Duerksen & Mantell, Interim Damages: A Remedy in Land Use Cases?, 33 LAND
USE LAW & ZONING DIGEST 6, 10

(1981).

117. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
118. 101 S.Ct. 1287 (1981).
119. Justice Brennan apparently would invalidate zoning actions decided by
referendum if the zoning ordinance voted upon constituted a taking. If the just
compensation clause demands compensation whenever there is a taking, the fact
that the decision was made by the voters would seem to be of no effect. How the
majority would deal with this issue is not clear. When the Court did address it,
the focus was on the majoritarian democratic process rather than taking or due
process issues. See City of East Lake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668
(1976)(Powell, J., dissenting).
120. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 546 (1967); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The good faith defense, however, is arguably no
longer available to a municipality in light of recent Supreme Court decisions expanding the liability of local governments for depriving individuals of their federal constitutional rights. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980)

[1981:143]

A REGULATION GONE TOO FAR?

fringement on personal liberties is a temporary, reversible deprivation of constitutional rights. 1 Another analogy can be made to the
revocation by the state of occupational or professional licenses.
The temporary loss of the ability to earn a livelihood (prior to an
administrative or judicial determination that the revocation was
not warranted) has not required the payment of damages even
though the governmental act amounted to a taking of private property.1 2 A more closely related area is pre-condemnation regulation.
When the courts have determined that the eminent domain

power-or more specifically, acts prior to but in contemplation of

condemnation-was exercised so as to depress or freeze land values
prior to actual condemnation, damages have been awarded.12 8
When condemnation is instituted but abandoned in good faith,
however, damages will not lie.124 The analogies to deprivation of
personal liberties by police agencies and to pre-condemnation activities would provide compensation for the injured party when the
government acted in bad faith but would merely invalidate the action when done in good faith. Such an application to land use regulation would provide deterrence to local governmental abuse of authority and would compensate the injured party while avoiding the
chilling effect on land use decisions made in good faith by the leg1 25
islative body.
The dissent's reasoning in San Diego would also mandate new
tactical considerations in litigating regulatory taking cases. Faced
and Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). These cases held that there is no good
faith defense available to a municipality that deprives a person of federal civil
rights granted by the Constitution (Owen) or federal statute (Thiboutot).
Whether the individual rights affected by the enactment of an invalid zoning ordinance would fall within those rights to which the good faith defense does not
apply, remains to be seen. The issue, however, may be soon moot as Congress is
considering legislation to restore the good faith defense for state political subdivisions. See S. 584 & S. 585, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. S1625 (1981).
121. Duerksen & Mantell, supra note 116 at 7. The authors of this article
filed amici curiae briefs in San Diego Gas.
122. K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 184 (3d ed. 1972). See also Duerksen &
Mantell, supra note 116, at 8.
123. San Antonio River Authority v. Garrett Brothers, 528 S.W.2d 266 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1975).
124. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1980). See also note 91
supra.
125. For a test to determine bad faith, see Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308,
322 (1975). The Court in Wood stated that bad faith will be established when a
public official acts with a malicious intent to cause a deprivation or when the
official acts in disregard of an individual's clearly established constitutional rights.
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with the possibility that the court will find a taking and thus order
payment of damages, municipalities will, of course, be forced to
mount a vigorous defense of the validity of their regulations. However, if their chances of prevailing appear slight, they could argue,
albeit anomalously, that if a taking is found, the purpose of the
regulation is not a public one, resulting in an invalidation of the
regulation rather than compensation to the temporarily injured
owner. 126
It could also be the case that the plaintiff-landowner would
not desire compensation but would seek injunctive relief or invalidation. This might be true where the landowner fears that if a taking is found, the government would decide to allow the regulation
to remain in effect or condemn the property outright. In either
case, he is deprived of his property, although with the payment of
just compensation. Thus, where a landowner wishes to maintain
ownership of his property and does not wish to sell at any price,
the form of relief would be effectively determined by the government, not the landowner. Attempts to have the regulation
amended, short of litigation (perhaps through negotiation or the
political process), might be the only options available to one who
wishes to maintain ownership and/or full use of his property. 127
Finally, the reasoning of the San Diego Gas dissent fails to
analyze precisely the interrelationship between the due process
and the just compensation clauses. If this reasoning were to be
adopted by a later majority, lower courts would require more definite guidelines for accomodating these constitutional mandates
than those provided by the variety of general and sometimes inconclusive tests of excessiveness used in examining police power
128
regulations.

126. On its face, the government's argument that the purpose of its own reg-

ulation is not a public one (i.e., where it does not further the general health,
safety and welfare) may seem farcical. However, by so doing and in conjunction
with the rescission of the regulation, damages would be avoided. In this context it
should be remembered that Justice Brennan would measure the time for which

temporary damages must be paid from the point the regulation takes effect until
the rescission or amendment of the regulation. See notes 80, 91-93 and accompa-

nying text supra.
127. Of course, the landowner could argue the regulation failed for lack of a
public purpose. See note 80 supra.

128. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)
(zoning ordinance must substantially advance legitimate state interest and may
not deny the property owner the economically viable use of his land); Pennsylva-

nia Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)(regulation which goes too far will be
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If just compensation takings are viewed as- those government
actions which involve a transfer of property rights from the property owner to the government 12 9 and regulatory takings as govern80
ment actions which do not involve a transfer of property rights,
the entire regulation-versus-taking issue becomes much clearer.
When a government act does work a transfer of property rights 8 1
the transfer is from the individual landowner to the government.
When a zoning regulation is imposed on land the transfer of property rights is not from the landowner to the government but from
the landowner to all the other landowners in the area or the community.1 2 Thus, if a regulation restricts the use of property to a
certain, obviously unreasonble purpose, 183 no taking would occur
because there has been no transfer of property rights to the government. Nevertheless, this would not necessarily render the regulation "reasonable," but if found "unreasonable", the regulation
would be invalid on due process grounds. 3 4 The problem has been
that the courts have so interwoven the due process-taking issues as
to make them indistinguishable. Nevertheless, since the relief ordered by the courts has been invalidation and not just compensation, the issue of whether a taking has occurred or due process denied, until now, has been of more academic than practical interest.
A clear distinction is important in light of San Diego Gas should
the court reach this issue in future regulatory taking cases."8 5
recognized as a taking); Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222,
15 N.E.2d 587 (1938)(property owner must show regulation will deny use of the
property to which it is reasonably adapted).
129. An example is the denial of street access rights previously enjoyed by
the land owner. See W. STOEBUCK, supra note 6, at 200.
130. A zoning restriction is an example of a burden on land, without a consequent transfer of property rights to the government.
131. See note 131 supra.
132. See W. STOEBUCK, supra note 6, at 200-01.
133. Id. at 201. The absurd example used by Professor Stoebuck was an ordinance restricting the use of land to the raising of wombats.
134. Id. Professor Stoebuck does recognize rare exceptions where a regulation
could amount to a taking. One is where, due to aircraft overflights, building height
restrictions are placed on adjacent property. The other exception is where government freezes land development to minimize land values in anticipation of a condemnation proceeding. In these examples there does seem to be a taking as the
property owner suffers a diminution in value with a corresponding increase in the
property rights of the government. The example of the aircraft overflights could
be viewed as a trespass, however, and would not do violence to Professor
Stoebuck's theory.
135. It should be noted that retired Justice Potter Stewart joined the dis-
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CONCLUSION

With the apparent endorsement of the dissent's reasoning in
San Diego Gas by the concurring opinion of Justice Rehnquist,
five members of the Court would hold that an arbitrary or excessive land use regulation can effect a just compensation taking. The
measure of damages, or just compensation, would be determined
according to the length of time an objectionable regulation was allowed to remain in effect. That period would begin at the point the
court determines that a taking had occurred and then continue until the government amended or rescinded the regulation.
In rejecting the public policy considerations of inhibiting local
legislative prerogative, an apparent majority of the Court ignored
other analyses which would allow the coexistence of those policy
considerations with an effective application of the just compensation clause on a sound, conceptual basis. The analytical view espoused by this majority of the Court is deficient in that its reliance
on cited precedent is misplaced, and it provides little clarity for its
future application while dramatically altering the available remedies. Although this decision is not binding on lower courts, it remains to be seen what number of those courts will attempt to apply the same reasoning and what efforts local governments will
make to avoid regulatory taking cases which could be properly
heard by the Court.
HARLAN

J. SPIROFF

senting opinion of Justice Brennan. With the appointment of Justice O'Connor to
the Supreme Court, it cannot be said with any certainty whether there remain
five justices who endorse Justice Brennan's reasoning. In terms of her political
philosophy, Justice O'Connor may agree with the dissent's reasoning. Nevertheless, because of her political experience as a member of the Arizona legislature,
she may be sympathetic to the position of local government.

